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SYMPOSIUM
TIMOR GAP:
THE LEGALITY OF THE "TREATY ON
THE ZONE OF COOPERATION IN AN
AREA BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN
PROVINCE OF EAST TIMOR AND
NORTHERN AUSTRALIA"
Roger S. Clarki
I. DAY OF INFAMY IN EAST TIMOR
On December 7, 1975, the thirty-fourth anniversary of the
day of infamy at Pearl Harbor, Indonesian forces invaded the
territory of East Timor, a Portuguese colony for some four and a
half centuries. Following the 1974 Portuguese revolution, East
Timor, like other Portuguese non-self-governing territories, had
been moving through a process of self-determination. Portu-
guese authorities evacuated the territory in August 1975 during
civil disorders, condoned, if not fomented by, the Indonesians.
FRETILIN,' a popular group which aimed at independence for
the territory after a short transitional period, gained the upper
hand in the struggle. On November 28, 1975, FRETILIN de-
clared independence, in hope that this would strengthen their
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers, the State University School of Law,
Camden, New Jersey. B.A., LL.M. (Victoria U. of Wellington), LL.M., J.S.D. (Columbia).
This is a revised version of a paper delivered by Professor Clark at the East Timor Sym-
posium, Trinity College, Oxford, 8 December 1990. Papers from that conference are ex-
pected to be published in 1993 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council
(USA). Professor Clark has represented the International League for Human Rights
since the 1970s in presenting material on the East Timor situation to the Fourth Com-
mittee of the United Nations General Assembly and to the Assembly's Special Commit-
tee on Decolonization.
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hand in dealing with Indonesian border incursions. A full-scale
Indonesian invasion followed. One might have thought that this
constituted a plain breach of the norms of the United Nations
Charter concerning the illegal use of force and self-determina-
tion.2 Indeed, at the United Nations, the General Assembly and
the Security Council both adopted resolutions 3 deploring the In-
donesian actions, reaffirming the right of the Timorese to self-
determination, and calling for the withdrawal of the Indonesian
forces. Although the political will has never been present to put
teeth into these resolutions,4 the United Nations continues to
treat Portugal as the legal administering power of the territory.
Moreover, the General Assembly has specifically rejected the
claim that East Timor has been legally integrated into
Indonesia.5
II. THE TIMOR GAP
The continental shelf area between northern Australia and
East Timor is believed to contain oil. Exploiting the area has
been complicated by the difficulty of delimiting boundaries,
given conflicting claims and sharp disagreement about the appli-
cable legal principles. Prior to 1975, Australia had some incon-
clusive negotiations with the Portuguese on the subject. More
recently, the discussions have taken place with the Indonesians.
The essence of the problem is that while the width of the sea in
the relevant area between the two coastlines varies from some
250 to 290 nautical miles, there are, geographically-speaking, two
continental margins between the two land masses. To the south
2 See generally Roger S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of East Timor and the
United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 2 (1980).
3 G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 118, U.N. Doc. A/
10034 (1976); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Year, Resolutions and Decisions 10, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/31 (1976).
4 The matter, however, refuses to go away. Note the recent widespread coverage of
the November 12, 1991 massacre by Indonesian troops in Dili, the capital of East Timor.
See, e.g., Notes and Comment, The Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 1991,
at 41.
5 In July of 1976, Indonesia purported to annex the territory. The General Assembly
rejected this claim, inasmuch as the people of the territory had been prevented from
freely exercising their right to self determination. G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 125, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
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there is a more than 200 nautical mile Australian margin, and to
the north a 40 to 70 nautical mile margin the two are separated
by a deeper area known as the Timor Trough. The issue is what
are the legal implications - if any - of the shape of the shelf or
shelves. Australia has argued essentially that it is entitled to the
full natural prolongation of its shelf to the edge of the margin,
while Portugal and Indonesia have argued that, since it is not
possible to accommodate a full 200 mile shelf for both Timor
and Australia, the median line of the shelf (ignoring the trough)
is where the boundary should be. The law on such delimitations
has been evolving in the past two decades and is still far from
clear. Both Australia and Portugal are parties to the 1958 Ge-
neva Convention on the Continental Shelf,6 so that as between
them, the Convention should provide the framework for a delim-
itation. The result of such an exercise is far from predictable.
Indonesia, while it signed the 1958 Convention, has not ratified
it. Presumably Indonesia would argue that the relevant rules are
those of customary law developed under the aegis of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea.8 This approach, especially
when account is taken of the development of the concept of Ex-
6 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, 449 U.N.T.S. 311. 6 (1) pro-
vides :
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more
States whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary of the continental
shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them.
In the absence of such agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by
special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.
Australia would argue that there are two shelves - not one that is the "same".
Portugal would argue for the equidistance rule. Contemporaneously with an Application
to the International Court of Justice concerning the Timor Gap Treaty, infra note 19,
Portugal insisted that Australia continue efforts to negotiate a delimitation of the shelf
with Portugal by application of the 1958 Convention. See Letter handed on Feb. 22, 1991
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia by the Ambassador of Portugal at Can-
berra, in U.N. Doc. A/46/97 (1991).
6 1982, Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982). 83's
"non-rule" on the subject provides that "The delimitation of the continental shelf be-
tween States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis
of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution." See also the extended definition of
the shelf in 76 (1): "to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin
does not extend up to that distance."
19921
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clusive Economic Zones (EEZs),9 suggests that some kind of me-
dian line should probably be drawn. The force of the Australian
argument, which is based on there being "two" shelves as a re-
sult of the geographic features, appears to have weakened in the
more recent practice.1"
In 1971 and 1972 Indonesia and Australia agreed to a shelf
boundary between them to the west and the east of East Timor,
since at that point, no one disputed that it was Portuguese terri-
tory." The agreed line tracked the shelf edge along the Timor
Trough essentially in accord with the Australian position. Thus,
Australia fared much better than Indonesia in terms of area in
this deal. Apparently Indonesia has since regretted its generos-
ity. The hole in the line of delimitation is popularly known as
"The Timor Gap."
It is in this context that Australia and Indonesia entered
into what is titled the "Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an
Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and
Northern Australia"' 2 ("the Treaty"). The Treaty was signed on
December 11, 1989 and subsequently ratified by the two par-
ties.' s The Treaty describes itself as a "provisional" solution to
' Indonesia lays general claim to a 200 mile EEZ. Articles 56 and 57 of the 1982
Convention appear to permit claims to be made over the sea-bed in an exclusive eco-
nomic zone of up to 200 nautical miles, regardless of the shape of the shelf. These Arti-
cles may well supersede some of the earlier legal notions of the continental shelf, but it is
all very uncertain.
10 For a case concerning the Continental Shelf, see Libya v. Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 6, 56:
"Each coastal State is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf off
its coasts for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources . . . up to a
distance of 200 miles from the baselines - subject of course to delimitation with neigh-
boring States - whatever the geophysical or geological features of the sea-bed within the
area comprised between the coast and the 200-mile limit." But see the dissenting opin-
ions of Judge Sette-Camara, id. at 61-62, and Judge Valticos, id. at 105. Those judges
saw the Timor Trough as exceptional, although their argument is obviously influenced by
viewing the 1971-72 Indonesian-Australian agreements, infra note 11, as state practice; a
practice, as it turns out, Indonesia came to regret.
" See Australia-Indonesia: Agreement Establishing Seabed Boundaries, done at
Canberra, May 18, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 830 (1971); Australia-Indonesia: Agreement on Cer-
tain Seabed Boundaries, done at Jakarta, Oct. 9, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1272 (1972); Australia-
Indonesia: Map of Seabed Boundary as Delineated in Agreement of Oct. 9, 1972, 12
I.L.M. 357 (1973).
" The Treaty is reproduced in 29 I.L.M. 469 (1990).
" The exploitation is now continuing apace, notwithstanding the uncertainties
caused by the Portuguese position, supra note 7 and infra note 19. On December 12,
1991 the Australian Federal Minister for Resources announced that eleven production-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/3
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the problem." The relevant part of the shelf between East Ti-
mor and Australia ("the Zone of Cooperation")"6 has been di-
vided under Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty into three "Areas."
Area A is in the middle and is to be jointly developed. Area B,
nearest to Australia, is an area of sole Australian jurisdiction.
However, Australia will allocate to Indonesia ten percent of the
gross Resource Rent Tax revenues, which is equivalent to six-
teen percent of the net Resource Rent Tax collected from this
area. Similarly, Area C, nearest to Indonesia, is an area of sole
Indonesian jurisdiction. However, Indonesia will allocate ten
percent of Contractors' Income Tax revenues from this area to
Australia. The whole deal - A, B and C - obviously comes as a
package, and the resources of the total package are thus subject
to sharing.
III. ILLEGALITY OF ENTERING INTO THE TREATY
My object here is to expand upon a view that has been es-
poused by the Government of Portugal in various protests to the
Australian authorities and to the United Nations, 6 and which I
sharing contracts with oil companies had been approved for exploration in Area A of the
Zone of Cooperation. Media Release, [Australian] Minister for Resources, DPIE91/320G.
14 See first preambular paragraph and Article 33 of the Treaty. "Provisional" in this
case means a minimum of 40 years, subject to renewal for 20 year periods. Id. According
to a note issued by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in January
of 1990, "Australia continues to assert sovereign rights over the seabed extending to the
geomorphological edge of the natural prolongation of Australia's continental shelf,
marked by the Timor Trough, i.e., slightly to the north of the Zone of Cooperation."
Note by Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Jan. 1990) (on file with
author).
6 William T. Onorato & Mark J. Valencia, International Cooperation for Petro-
leum Development: The Timor Gap Treaty, 5 ICSID REV. FOR. INVEST. L.J. 1, 5 (1990),
describe the area thus:
The Zone is delineated on the northern side by a simplified bathymetric axis line;
on the southern side by a 200 nautical mile line measured from the Indonesian
archipelagic baselines; on the eastern and western sides by equidistance lines.
Thus both States conceded the extreme boundary claims of the other and presum-
ably the principles on which they were based. These equidistant lines are deter-
mined by the former relationships between the coasts of Indonesia and Portuguese
Timor. The northern limit of the coffin-shaped Zone is a simplified line marking
the axis of the Timor Trough. The southern limit lies 200nm from the coast of
Timor. The two other intermediate lines that separate the three areas are a
straight line in the general vicinity of the 1,500 meter isobath and median lines
between Australian and Indonesian territories.
"e See, e.g., Question of East Timor, Letter dated November 10, 1988 from the Per-
1992]
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have previously addressed in outline"T: The Australian Govern-
ment has acted in breach of its international obligations by en-
tering into the Timor Gap Treaty' s with Indonesia. I believe,
that this Treaty is null and void under international law and
that, if properly seized of the issue,' 9 the International Court of
manent Representative of Portugal addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee
on Decolonization, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/981 (1989).
" See Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and De-
fence (Reference: East Timor), Commonwealth of Australia, Official Hansard Report
1388, 1400 (1982); Letter to Gordon McIntosh, Senator for Western Australia, 27 Febru-
ary 1986. Sasha S. Stepan assisted me in developing my views during the writing of her
monograph entitled Credibility Gap: The Timor Gap Agreement and its International
Implications (1989) (on file with author).
"8 Supra note 12. It is not my purpose here to criticize its details. If the Treaty had
been validly entered into with the party having legitimate status, unlike Indonesia, then
it would certainly seem to be a creative solution to an awkward boundary problem. See
generally Onorato & Valencia, supra note 15. In this Article, my focus is on the legiti-
macy of the whole enterprise. On principles of delimitation in such cases, see generally
CATRIONA COOK, THE AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA MARITIME BOUNDARY, OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN
MARITIME AFFAIRS 40 (1985). On the Treaty, see also Ernst Willheim, Australia-Indone-
sia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development Zone in the
"Timor Gap", 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821 (1989) (which contains some useful maps);
Keith Suter, Oil in Troubled Waters, INSIDE INDON., Dec. 1988, at 7; Henry Burmester,
The Timor Gap Treaty, [1990] AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM ASS'N Y.B. 233 (and several
commentaries on the Burmester piece in that volume); Kym P. Livesley, The Timor Gap
Treaty - An Update, AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM L. ASS'N BULL. 213 (1991); Garrie J.
Moloney, Australian-Indonesian Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty: A New Off-
shore Petroleum Regime, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 128 (1990); Anthony Bergin,
The Australian-Indonesian Timor Gap Maritime Boundary Agreement, 5 INT'L J. ESTU-
ARINE & COASTAL L. 383 (1990).
" For example, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) would have jurisdiction to
decide the validity of the treaty if either Portugal or a future independent East Timor
raised the issue. Litigating all the issues is complicated since, while Australia and Portu-
gal have made declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, Indonesia has not. In
fact, Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia in the International Court on Feb-
ruary 22, 1991. However, Portugal neither challenged the validity of the Timor Gap
Treaty, nor the use of force in the acquisition of the territory. Instead, Portugal empha-
sizes both Australia's obligation not to act contrary to the duties of Portugal as adminis-
tering power, and the interests of the people of the territory. Portugal's Application was
public at the time of writing, but not at its initial Memorial. Pare. 1 of the Application
reads:
1. The dispute relates to the opposability to Australia: (a) of the duties of, and
delegation of authority to, Portugal as the administering Power of the Territory of
East Timor; and (b) of the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination,
and the related rights (right to territorial integrity and unity and permanent sov-
ereignty over natural wealth and resources).
Portugal maintains that, in its capacity of administering Power within the
meaning of Article 73 of the Charter, it is performing an international public ser-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/3
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Justice (I.C.J.) would so decide. Needless to say, in making this
case, I do not mean in any way to minimize the blatant illegality
of Indonesia's aggression against, and denial of self-determina-
tion to, East Timor. I have, indeed, addressed that issue at
length elsewhere.20 Apparently, the illegality of Indonesia's ac-
tions is not disputed by the Australian authorities," and has, of
course, been duly noted in resolutions of the Security Council2
and the General Assembly. 3 One of the many tragedies of the
vice and that, so long as the United Nations has not discharged it from its respon-
sibility, it is invested with the corresponding duties and powers, which continue to
be opposable, as do the rights of the people of East Timor, erga omnes, and in
particular to all the member States of the United Nations and hence to Australia.
2. The dispute has arisen from the actions, recounted below, by which Australia
has, in the view of Portugal, failed to observe, at least, the obligation to respect
the duties and powers of the administering Power as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and the
related rights, and Article 25 of the Charter; Australia by so doing has incurred
international responsibility vis-a-vis both the people of East Timor and Portugal.
Those activities, shortly stated, have taken the form of the negotiation and
conclusion by Australia with a third State of an agreement relating to the explora-
tion and exploitation of the continental shelf in the area of the "Timor Gap" and
the negotiation, currently in progress, of the delimitation of that same shelf with
that same third State.
Presumably, in spite of this effort to draft the pleadings in such a way as to emphasize
Australia's breaches of international law rather than those of Indonesia, Australia will
argue some variations on the theme that Indonesia is an indispensable party in the pro-
ceedings which should therefore not proceed. See generally Iain Scobbie, The East Ti-
mor Case: the Implications of Procedure for Litigation Strategy (unpublished manu-
script of lecture given at various Portuguese universities, November 1991, on file with
author).
20 Clark, supra note 2. See also Paula Escarameia, Formation of Concepts Under
International Law: Subsumption Under Self-Determination in the Case of East Timor
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School, 1988).
" As the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supra note 14, put it, "[t]his
recognition in no way implies approval of the circumstances of acquisition." See also,
Statement by Senator Gareth Evans to Timor Gap Forum, Darwin, November 3, 1990
(on file with the author).
" The Situation in Timor, S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Year, Resolutions and
Decisions, at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31 (1976) and S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Year,
Resolutions and Decisions, at 18, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1977).
23 Question of Timor, G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34,
at 118, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976). The General Assembly continued to adopt resolutions
critical of Indonesia through 1982. See G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp.
No. 39, at 125, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); G.A. Res. 32/34, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp.
No. 45, at 169, U.N. Doc. A/32/357 (1978); G.A. Res. 33/39, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp.
No. 45, at 181, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979); G.A. Res. 34/40, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 46, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); G.A. Res. 35/27, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp.
No. 48, at 219, U.N. Duc. A/35/48 (1981); G.A. Res. 36/50, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp.
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Timor situation is, however, that otherwise law-abiding govern-
ments such as those of Australia, the United States and of my
own country, New Zealand, have for political reasons not been
prepared to take a stand on this issue, which I believe their own
assessment of the facts should have required them to make.
There are times when even one's friends should be called on to
take responsibility, and this is one of them!
IV. THE DUTY NOT To RECOGNIZE THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY THROUGH UNLAWFUL FORCE
In its simplest form, my argument is that, by entering into
the Treaty, Australia breached an international obligation. This
obligation is reflected24 in two unanimously-adopted resolutions
of the United Nations General Assembly: the 1970 Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States,2" and the 1974 Resolution
on the Definition of Aggression.26 The 1970 resolution was
adopted in celebration of the occasion of the twenty-fifth anni-
versary of the organization, after a careful seven-year drafting
period. The resolution provides that: "The territory of a state
shall not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting
from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition result-
ing from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal."'
The scope of the 1974 resolution is perhaps narrower,2" but in
No. 51, at 200, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982); G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 227, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983). The issue has remained on the agendas of the
General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonization, but no substantive res-
olutions have been adopted in recent years. The Secretary-General has continued with
endeavors to find a solution.
" "Reflected" is a little ambiguous, but has been chosen deliberately. See infra
notes 48 and 52.
25 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971).
28 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) Art. 5, para. 3, 29 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31,
at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
"' G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 25. The paragraphs are not numbered in this
resolution.
28 It provides "No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from agres-
sion is or shall be recognized as lawful." Unlike the 1974 resolution, which speaks of
"aggression", the 1970 resolution speaks of "threat or use of force." In the context of the
territories occupied by Israel, debate has been joined about whether territory can be
properly acquired following a lawful use of force - as in self-defense. See, e.g., Malvina
[Vol. 4:69
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terms equally apposite to the Timor situation as characterized
by the Security Council 9 and the General Assembly"0 : "No terri-
torial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression
shall be recognized as lawful."'"
The language of the 1970 Friendly Relations resolution is
quite blunt and has a rather obligatory ring: "No territorial ac-
quisition or special advantage resulting from the threat or use of
force shall be recognized as legal."32 One might have thought,
just from reading it, that it carried some obligations with it,
moral or even legal. Note the mandatory sound of the word
"shall" in a context where apparently less imperative provisions
of the Friendly Relations instrument use the softer "should.
3 3
Moreover, one might have expected some embarrassment in ig-
noring it, since the Australian Government participated actively
on the Committee that drafted the 1970 resolution and co-spon-
sored the draft when it reached the General Assembly. 4 Instead,
Australian Senator Gareth Evans, a former law teacher and now
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, has on several occasions
denied the relevance of the Friendly Relations Declaration. Re-
sponding to a question from Senator McIntosh, Senator Evans,
in the Australian Senate on March 20, 1986, made the following
claim: "I make it plain that the legal status of [the Friendly Re-
lations] declaration, which is not a treaty in any sense, has long
been very hotly contested. ' 35 On November 1, 1989, he repeated
much of the language that he had used in 1986:
[W]e have taken the view since 1979 that whatever the unhappy
Halberstam, Recognition, Use of Force and the Legal Effect of United Nations Resolu-
tions Under the Revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, 19 ISR. L. REV. 495 (1984); JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
156 (1987). Dugard goes as far as to contend that even acquisition following lawful force
is contrary to principles of jus cogens. (On jus cogens, see infra at note 90.) It is not
necessary to pursue this line of debate here since the Indonesian actions come within the
core meaning of unlawful force condemned by both resolutions.
" Supra note 22.
30 Supra note 23.
3, Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 26.
32 Supra text accompanying note 27.
33 For example, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 25, at 123, asserts that states
"should" co-operate in the economic, social and cultural fields, and "should" co-operate
in the promotion of economic growth, especially that of the developing countries.
34 1970 U.N.Y.B. 787, U.N. Sales No. 3.72.1.1 (Australia one of 64 co-sponsors).
3' Hansard, Senate, (Australia) 20 March 1986, at 1377.
1992]
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circumstances and indeed, possible illegality, surrounding Indone-
sia's acquisition of East Timor in the mid-1970's, Indonesian sov-
ereignty over that territory should be accepted not only on a de
factor [sic] but on a de jure basis. There is no binding legal obli-
gation not to recognize the acquisition of a territory that was ac-
quired by force. Such a recognition does not, of course, imply ap-
proval of the circumstances of the acquisition. In international
law the legality of the original acquisition of territory by a state
has to be distinguished in subsequent dealings between the state
acquiring that new territory and other states - in this instance,
Australia."
More recently, on November 3, 1990,17 Senator Evans added
that "[t]his recognition does not mean that Australia condones
the method of incorporation - on the contrary, the Government
has been forthright in protesting the circumstances of incorpora-
tion. '3 8 I believe that the Senator is dead wrong on three fronts:
3' Hansard, Senate, (Australia) 1 November 1989, at 2702. I am puzzled by the way
the word "distinguished" is used in the last sentence. It also appears almost verbatim in
other statements by the Minister. It seems to suggest that the legality of the acquisition
is to be distinguished from something else, but the fragment of the sentence that ex-
plains the something else has not been included. I take it that the something else is the
way other states treat the title in later dealings. If this is what it means, this sentence is
a restatement of the basic point that there is no obligation to deny recognition to title
acquired by aggression. This is the point that I dissent from in the text. Perhaps the
Minister had in mind something like the position very tentatively advanced in R.Y. JEN-
NINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963), before the adoption
of the 1970 and 1974 resolutions. Jennings asserts that "It seems therefore impossible
any longer to concede that the successful seizure of another's territory by force, i.e. con-
quest, or subjugation, may be itself a lawful title to territory." Id. at 67. He goes on to
discuss the case of "the State that has successfully seized possession of territory by ille-
gal force and seems likely to stay." He writes: "It is suggested that in these circum-
stances it may eventually come about that a title by consolidation is acquired through
recognitions or other forms of acknowledgment of the position expressive of the will of
the international community." Id. See also id. at 64, suggesting that there should be
"some collectivization of the process, possibly through the United Nations itself which
would, one must presume, have been involved already in dealing with the illegal resort to
force." Perhaps Australia should sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly recogniz-
ing Indonesia's "consolidation" of its position!
"7 Senator Gareth Evans, Statement to the Timor Gap Forum, supra note 21, at 3.
38 In light of this statement, which is part of a consistent pattern of Australian
statements, Australia is surely precluded from now arguing that, contrary to the assess-
ment of others, what the Indonesians did was perfectly legitimate. Had Australia from
the start argued that the incorporation was legal, it could now, at least as a rhetorical
posture, tough out the contrary assessment of others (including a majority of the General
Assembly) and argue that, on the facts as Australia sees it, the norm of non-recognition
does not apply. My position is simply that a state like Australia, acting in good faith on
[Vol. 4:69
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he is wrong about the status of the Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations being hotly contested; he is wrong about there being no
legal obligation to comply with its requirement of non-recogni-
tion; and he is wrong in the suggestion that his Government has
paid its international dues once it "has been forthright in pro-
testing the circumstances of incorporation." 3 1 Australia has an
obligation to go beyond that.
An understanding of the nature of General Assembly resolu-
tions and their role in the creation of international law is neces-
sary to discuss a resolution's binding effect on U.N. Member
States. During the drafting of the U.N. Charter, "° an effort to
give the General Assembly a broad legislative power failed.41
Moreover, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which describes "international law" 42 at least for the
purposes of the jurisdiction of the Court, and which is widely
regarded as generally more useful,43 makes no reference to reso-
lutions of international organizations amongst its "sources" of
law. Article 13 of the United Nations Charter does, however, em-
power the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make rec-
ommendations for the purpose of. . .encouraging the progres-
sive development of international law and its codification.",
the basis of its own assessment of the facts, must apply the rule of non-recognition.
Because of the clarity of the facts, Senator Evans has found it necessary to try to take
the high ground and deny the legal status of the obligation.
"' No doubt there are those who dispute the forthrightness of the Australian
protests.
40 U.N. CHARTER (1945).
" A proposal to this effect (subject to further approval by a majority vote in the
Security Council) by the Philippines was rejected 26-1 in Commission II at the 1945 San
Francisco Conference. 9 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 316 (1945).
"' Article 38 of the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter
I.C.J. STATUTE] refers to four sources:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
(d) subject to Article 59, judicial decisions of the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.
"' See, e.g., the reference to it in 83 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 8.
" U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1.
The difference between the two terms progressive development and codification
used in the Charter is explained in article 15 of the [International Law] Commis-
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There are two ways in which some widely accepted General
Assembly resolutions can become law: either by custom or by an
authentic interpretation of the U.N. Charter. Article 38 of the
I.C.J. statute lists among its sources "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted by law."'4 5 Customary law
is composed of two elements: (1)state practice and (2)an indica-
tion that the practice is regarded by states as legally binding
rather than coincidentally concordant." The second element is
usually referred to in its Latin form - opinio juris.47 Tradition-
ally, before the latter part of the nineteenth century and the rise
of international organizations, most state practice and expres-
sion of opinio juris took place in a bilateral setting. But all that
has changed, particularly with the dramatic alteration in the na-
ture of diplomacy brought about by the birth of the United Na-
tions and its subsequent membership by many new nations.
Against this backdrop, assume that all the states of the
United Nations (or even most of them) were to behave in a par-
ticular way, pursuant to Article 13 of the U.N. Charter, by
adopting a resolution espousing a particular point of interna-
tional law, and that they were to express their opinio juris in
that resolution, either expressly or impliedly." Such actions
must in appropriate cases contribute to customary international
law, perhaps in a definitive fashion where the practice is deemed
unequivocal.49
sion's Statute. For convenience codification is used as meaning the more precise
formulation and systematization of rules of public international law in fields
where there has already been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine.
Progressive development is used as meaning the preparation of draft conventions
on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to
which the law has not been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.
SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1984).
4' I.C.J. STATUTE supra note 42, at art. 38, para. 1.
" Ian MacGibbon, Means for the Identification of International Law, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 10, 19 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982).
,' "For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must
appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation. Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 102 cmt. c. (1987).
"' See infra note 52.
" See Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General As-
sembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966); and see generally, American Law Institute, Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102, cmts. b and c and Reporters' Note 2
(1987) and authorities cited therein espousing the basic view suggested in the text.
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Suppose further that all or most of the parties to an inter-
national treaty such as the Charter of the United Nations adopt,
after exhaustive discussion, a set of rules that spell out some of
the details of a number of the general principles contained in
the treaty. Might not this be fairly assimilated to the treaty it-
self?5 Such an effort is sometimes referred to as an "authorita-
tive interpretation" of the treaty in question. 1
With this discussion on the role of General Assembly resolu-
tions in mind, let me return to the Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions. My case is that it represents either a customary rule or an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter, and thus should
have the full and binding force of International Law.
The Friendly Relations Declaration asserts that it is con-
cerned with the progressive development and codification of the
principles addressed within it.52 Contrary to Senator Evans' po-
sition, I do not believe the status of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations was ever hotly debated.
I have searched the literature in vain for evidence of this
hot debate. We do not have the benefit of Senator Evans'
50 Unlike some constitutions that grant a power to make definitive interpretations of
the constitution to a particular organ of government - typically a Court - the Charter
is silent on who has the final power of interpretation. This means that, in the first in-
stance at least, the General Assembly can make its own determination. See United Na-
tions Conference on International Organization, Report of Rapporteur of Committee IV/
2, San Francisco 1945, excerpted in FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THEIR LEGAL SETTING 382 (1977). If an organ such as the General Assembly asks the
Court for advice, the Court at least gives considerable weight to what the organ has done
in the past. See Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16.
51 Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, March 22-27, 1968, in 9
J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 94 (1968); RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 127 (2d ed. 1991). See also Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties art. 31 (3) (b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), which asserts
that in interpreting a treaty, there shall be taken into account, together with the context,
"any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation."
52 See the Declaration, supra note 25, preambular para. 17. Article 13 of the Charter
speaks both of "progressive development" and of "codification." U.N. CHARTER art. 13,
§1. Where a rule is in the fluid stage, reasonable people might differ about whether its
clarification amounts to mere codification or whether more is being done to develop it.
My point about the Friendly Relations Declaration is that whether it codified or devel-
oped does not particularly matter. Whatever the case, the development was complete by
then.
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sources for his assertion." I thought that the obvious place to
look was at the preparatory work on the drafting of the Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations, to see whether the Australian repre-
sentatives involved in its drafting had placed on the record some
specific reservations about the whole exercise or some substan-
tial part of it. However, no such reservation was made. On May
1, 1970, the Australian representative on the special committee
of thirty-one states that drafted the Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations stated:
[H]is delegation was pleased at the progress reflected in the draft
declaration and paid a tribute to those who had contributed to its
production. The task of the Committee had not been to amend
the Charter but, in accordance with Article 13 [of the Charter], to
elaborate some of its most important principles for the purpose of
encouraging the progressive development and codification of in-
ternational law.
5 4
He also made some remarks that may well have been aimed at
Indonesia for its "confrontation" against Malaysia in 1963-66 in
which it used guerilla tactics to further territorial claims, efforts
that Australia helped to overcome:55
The inclusion in the principle on the non-use of force of a para-
graph stating that States had a duty to refrain from organizing or
" It is believed that the government received some unpublished advice on the mat-
ter in general from Professor Don Greig of the Australian National University. Laurie
Ferguson, a member of the Australian House of Representatives, endeavored to obtain a
copy of this unpublished material. His efforts were rebuffed by the Department of For-
eign Affairs and Trade. After some discussion about the benefits for Australia "in terms
of strengthening our ties with an important regional neighbor and providing an interim
solution to a maritime boundary dispute" the departmental response continued: "[y]ou
will appreciate therefore that it is Government policy not to make public any confiden-
tial and privileged legal advice which may have been prepared in reaction to the treaty.
The release of such material would be contrary to the national interests which the Gov-
ernment is seeking to promote." Letter from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to
Laurie Ferguson, Member for Reid, dated Sept. 6, 1990 (on file with the author).
" Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations And Co-operation Among States, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
18, at 104, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970). For a definition of progressive development and
codification, see supra note 44. (The particular Australian speaker is not identified in the
text of the Report. It was presumably either Mr. Owen Davis, listed in the Annex to the
Report as "Representative", or Mr. David Evans, listed as "Alternate.")
" See generally J.A.C. MACKIE, KONFRONTASI: THE INDONESIA-MALAYSIA DIspuTE
1963-1966 (1974). The remarks may also have been prompted in part by Australia's in-
volvement in the Vietnam War.
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encouraging the organization of any form of irregular forces or
armed bands was essential. So too, were references to the prohibi-
tion on organizing or participating in actions of civil strife in an-
other State. These activities were unfortunately present in the
area of which Australia formed a part, namely in South East Asia,
and were a breach of Article 2 (4) of the Charter. 6
In this statement, the representative of Australia appears to
support the proposition (which does not seem to be disputed)
that this part of the Declaration on Friendly Relations
amounted to a spelling out of the broad generalities of Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the Charter. He also addressed himself to the
role of General Assembly resolutions more generally in creating
international law. Singling out the sixteenth preambular para-
graph of the Declaration on Friendly Relations,57 he said:
On preambular paragraph 16, the Australian view was that Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions were recommendatory and not binding
upon Member States. Resolutions of the General Assembly could
therefore play on [sic. only?] a limited role in relation to the in-
terpretation of the declaration. There would be different ideas
about which resolutions, or parts thereof, were relevant, and in
any case they could not be understood as overriding or amending
provisions of the Charter."8
This is hardly a vigorous attack on the legal status of the Decla-
ration. Indeed, the statement seems to concede that the Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations has some such status but is aimed at
preventing the Declaration from bootstrapping up some other
(unnamed and perhaps unknown) resolutions that the represen-
tative feared might surface to cause trouble. The argument goes
to weight and relevance in particular cases and refers to other
resolutions, not to the Declaration on Friendly Relations. And,
of course, this argument is correct. Some resolutions simply do
11 Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations And Co-operation Among States, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
18, at 104, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
57 "Considering the provisions of the Charter as a whole and taking into account the
role of relevant resolutions adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations re-
lating to the content of the principles .. " G.A. REs. 2625 (XXV), supra note 25.
S Supra note 56. (Author's emphasis.) It appears from the Summary records of the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly that a Mr. Brennan repeated the same speech
for Australia on Sept. 23, 1970. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1178 at 8-9 (1970).
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not command the respect that the Friendly Relations one does,
and thus lend less support to the notion that such resolutions
should be given the force of law.
As vigor goes, however, this statement seems to have been
the most vigorous assertion in the debates. Robert Rosenstock, a
leading commentator on the Declaration on Friendly Relations
and Adviser on Legal Affairs of the United States Mission to the
United Nations, is not a bold proponent of the law-making
power of General Assembly resolutions. He makes the following
comment, worth quoting at some length:
There is some difference of opinion among Members of the
United Nations as to whether the Declaration represents a mere
recommendation5 9 or a statement of binding legal rules. The truth
would appear to lie somewhere between these two extremes, but
closer to the latter. Two considerations point to the more limited
view as to the effect of the adoption of the text on the state of
international law. The first is that there is no difference in United
Nations practice between the term "declaration" and "recommen-
dation." Secondly, statements accepted by the San Francisco
Conference limit to some extent the efficacy of efforts at interpre-
tation other than through the amendment route. The principles
involved, however, are acknowledged by all to be principles of the
Charter. By accepting the respective texts, states have acknowl-
edged that the principles represent their interpretations of the
obligations of the Charter. The use of "should" rather than
"shall" in those instances in which the Committee believed it was
speaking de lege ferenda or stating mere desiderata further sup-
ports the view that the states involved intended to assert binding
rules of law where they used language of firm obligation."
Perhaps I was clutching at straws in an attempt to make
Senator Evans' case. In any event, the death knell to the Evans
'9 Here Rosenstock cites the Brennan statement in the Sixth Committee, supra note
58. In my view it is not even as strong as Rosenstock reads it, or even relevant since it is
addressed to other resolutions.
"0 Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 714-15 (1971) (footnotes omit-
ted). The Indonesian representative, Mr. Rachmad, was at the binding end of the spec-
trum. "He agreed with other delegations that the formulation of the seven principles was
of a legal character and hoped that it would receive widespread support when it was
considered by the General Assembly." U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1182 at 33 (1970) (emphasis
added).
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argument regarding a hot contest was surely sounded by the
I.C.J. decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua.61 That case concerned the
United States support of the contras who were fighting against
the Nicaraguan government. Because of the jurisdictional stance
of the case,62 Nicaragua was not able to rely on arguments based
on Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and
analogous provisions of the Organization of American States
Charter. Nicaragua was therefore constrained to make a custom-
ary law argument based in substantial part on the Declaration
on Friendly Relations. After noting that both Nicaragua and the
United States had accepted the treaty obligation to refrain from
the use of force contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, the Court
continued:
The Court has, however, to be satisfied that there exists in
customary international law an opinio juris as to the binding
character of such abstention. This opinio juris may, though with
all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the
Parties and the attitude of States towards certain General Assem-
bly resolutions, and particularly resolution 2625 (XXV) entitled
"Declaration on Principles on International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations". The effect of consent to
the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that
of a "reiteration or elucidation" of the treaty commitment under-
taken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as
an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared
by the resolution by themselves.a"
"1 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua,
1986 I.C.J. 14.
2 The United States' 1946 acceptance of the jurisdiction excepted "disputes arising
under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision
are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America spe-
cially agrees to the jurisdiction." The Court found that El Salvador, at least, was a party
"affected." 1986 I.C.J. 14, 38.
6 1986 I.C.J. 14, 89-90. (Author's emphasis.) The Court seems to have taken for
granted that there was plenty of supporting state practice and that all that remained was
the opinio problem. The Court went on to note the expression of the same principle in
the resolution of the Sixth Annual Conference of American States condemning aggres-
sion (Feb. 18, 1928), the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Dec.
26, 1933) and the Helsinki Accords of 1975. In context, in referring to these items, the
Court was addressing the opinio juris of the United States which this represented. Even
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In short, Senator Evans' argument that legal status of the
Declaration on Friendly Relations is hotly contested is a shaky
one. In fact, there is strong authority that it represents a legal
obligation. In the Nicaragua case, the Court was of course ad-
dressing itself to the basic rule on the non-use of force, rather
than the corollary about the non-recognition of the fruits of ille-
gal force.6 4 But the 1970 formulation came as a package and I
can find no statements anywhere to the effect that some parts of
the package are less obligatory than others.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations rule of non-recogni-
tion was developing in international law for half a century6 5 The
Declaration did not suddenly arrive on the scene in 1970. Some
have traced the doctrine back to Article 10 of the League of Na-
tions Covenant;6 6 some to the Kellogg-Briand Pact under which
the parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy in
their relations with one another;6" and others to Article 2, para-
graph 4 of the U.N. Charter.6 I would certainly rely upon the
cumulative effect of much reiteration of the doctrine. Robert
Langer, author of the 1947 work Seizure of Territory, asserted
the existence of a legal obligation not to recognize territorial
changes effected by force.6 Another author, Ian Brownlie, es-
if the opinio of such acts cannot be attributed to Australia, there is certainly plenty of
state practice represented in such events. Australia's opinio is demonstrated by the
Charter itself and by Resolution 2625 (XXV).
64 1986 I.C.J. 14.
" This is why I chose the word "reflected" earlier to describe what the 1970 resolu-
tion does with the principle - the resolution merely crystallizes what had long been de-
veloping, if not developed.
"' "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against exter-
nal aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the
Members of the League. In case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council
should advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
" Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Pol-
icy, done at Paris, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 59 (1929).
68 "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
6 ROBERT LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRITORY: THE STIMSON DOCTRINE AND RELATED
PRINCIPLES IN LEGAL THEORY AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1947). Langer refers, as state
practice, notably to the Stimson notes on Manchuria to Japan and China on Jan. 7, 1932
and the subsequent reaffirmations of the principles therein; the Resolution of the League
of Nations Assembly of March 11, 1932, also on Manchuria; the Chaco Declaration of
Aug. 3, 1932 by 19 American republics asserting non-recognition of territory obtained by
conquest; the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty of Oct. 10, 1933; the Montevideo Con-
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poused a similar position in 1963 in his work International Law
and the Use of Force by States."" Furthermore, the rule of non-
recognition has been applied in subsequent United Nations
practice. For example, in one of its resolutions on Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, the Security Council insisted that "annexation of Ku-
wait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal
validity, and is considered null and void." It called upon all
states and international organizations "not to recognize that an-
nexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might
be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation."71
Furthermore, there is the matter of the 1974 General As-
sembly Resolution on Definition of Aggression.7 " Not wishing to
belabor the point, I merely note that the legislative history of
that resolution demonstrates no hot debate either. I have found
no statements by Australia, or anyone else, disassociating them-
selves from the principle of non-recognition. Australia was a
member of the Committee that labored for seven years on the
vention on the Rights and Duties of States of Dec. 21, 1933. Id. at 95. See also his
discussion of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and attempts to either
amend or interpret it (depending on your point of view) so as to assert a rule of non-
recognition. Id. at 40-49.
70 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 418 (1963).
See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-107, 122-
23, 418-19 (1979). Crawford speaks of a general principle that ex injuria jus non oritur.
Much of the literature, and state practice, deals with non-recognition of the Soviet ac-
quisition of the Baltic States. See, e.g., Heino Ambros, Nonrecognition - Its Develop-
ment in International Law and Application by the United States With Particular Ref-
erence to the Baltic States (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1965);
William J.H. Hough III, The Annexation of the Baltic States and its Effect on the
Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory, 6 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COmP. L. 301 (1985); KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 398-416, 551-587 (1968).
71 S.C. RES. 662, adopted on 9 August 1990, U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and
Decisions, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1991). I suppose that Australia might try to re-
spond that the situations are different because the Security Council did not adopt such a
resolution in the case of East Timor. The answer to this is that the obligation not to
recognize arises from the general law - not from the Security Council resolution. In the
case of Iraq, the political forces were such that it was possible for the Security Council to
remind states of their obligations under the law. See also operative para. 5 of G.A. RES.
31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 125, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977) in which
the General Assembly (Australia abstaining): "Rejects the claim that East Timor has
been integrated into Indonesia, inasmuch as the people of the territory have not been
able to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence." The General
Assembly spoke strongly for the international community.
" Supra note 28.
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drafting of the resolution and was a co-sponsor when it was
adopted by a unanimous General Assembly.73 The relevant lan-
guage in the 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression is
written in equally mandatory terms to the 1970 formulation,
even if its field of application is arguably narrower in ways not
relevant in the present context.7 4 Once again, non-recognition
was stated in the language of obligation and Australia was
deeply involved in the acceptance of that language by the
Assembly.
To summarize, the Australian Government had an interna-
tional obligation not to recognize Indonesia's forcible acquisition
of the territory of East Timor.7 5 Merely being "forthright in pro-
testing the circumstances of incorporation ' '  is not enough.
One might reasonably ask how I think Australia might have
behaved differently. I believe that the principled position for
Australia to take was to refuse to deal with the Indonesians,
even if this meant that the boundaries of the continental shelf
would not be delimited and the area in question would remain,
for the foreseeable future, unexploited. There is nothing obvi-
ously obnoxious about leaving resources untapped for reasons of
principle. For example, consider the case of Antarctica," in re-
spect of which Australia has played a leading protective role.
" U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1502 at 227 (1974). According to the representative of Indo-
nesia, Mr Wisnoemoerti:
His delegation welcomed Article 5, in particular the third paragraph, which reaf-
firmed the principle of international law according to which any territorial acqui-
sition resulting from the threat or use of force was inadmissible and should not be
recognized.
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1482 at 110 (1974).
" Supra note 28.
"' In an earlier writing, see supra note 2, I made the point that Indonesia's action
breached the separate norm of self-determination as well as the proscription of the use of
force, and both points are made in the relevant Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions deploring the Indonesian military intervention. One can probably argue that
international law also requires that such a denial of self-determination independently
requires non-recognition. However, this point is not as developed either in state practice
or in the literature. In view of the strength of the case concerning use of force, it is not
necessary to pursue the denial of self-determination for the purposes of the present anal-
ysis. See also infra note 91, on self-determination and jus cogens.
7' Senator Evans, supra note 38.
7 M. Browne, France and Australia Kill Pact on Limited Antarctic Mining and Oil
Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1989, at A 10, col. 1; David C. Scott, Australia Advocates
"Wilderness" Status for Antarctica, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 24, 1989, at 4.
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But let me, for the purposes of argument only, concede what
I believe is the kernel of the Australian position: at some point it
is necessary to "get on with it" and accept that the Indonesians
are in control and that they must be dealt with to some degree.
There is, indeed, some force to this argument. There are situa-
tions which may arise that make it necessary to deal with the
Indonesians, such as humanitarian arrangements for refugees,
questions on the validity of a marriage or divorce arising in an
Australian court or even an international tribunal, or the regis-
tration of a birth performed by Indonesian authorities in East
Timor after the takeover. In these situations it is probable that
some exceptions will be made. The hard question is where to
draw the lines. 78 In a comparable case regarding the illegal occu-
pation of Namibia the I.C.J. released an advisory opinion indi-
cating that such exceptions must be narrowly drawn.e
How might that line of reasoning apply to the Timor Gap? I
suggest this reasoning indicates that if some treaty arrangement
has to be made, it must be one which itself asserts the basic
non-recognition principle, and further reserves a position on this
point. Apparently no attempt was made to do this. The Austra-
lian authorities conceded from the very beginning of the treaty
negotiations that dealing with the Indonesians on the issue re-
quired that they accept and recognize Indonesian sovereignty de
jure.80
" See generally Hans Blix, Contemporary Aspects of Recognition, 130 R.C.A.D.I.
589, 662-65 (1970).
7. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 56:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived
from international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termi-
nation of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended.
to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and mar-
riages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants
of the Territory.
For a similar discussion by the Privy Council, see Madzimbomuto v. Lardner-Burke
[1968] 3 ALL ENG. REP. 561 (illegal Rhodesian regime).
"0 The concession appears to have taken place as early as February 1979. See, e.g.,
statement by Senator Evans, Australian Hansard, Senate, 18 October 1988, at 1525. I
have yet to be persuaded of the inevitability of this position. I do not see why as a legal/
diplomatic position they could not have dealt with Indonesia insisting that they were
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Yet why should this be so? And where is the authority for
this position in international law? Surely it is not beyond the wit
of the diplomatic mind to say something like "I am dealing with
you because necessity demands, but I do not thereby concede
your legitimacy." Nothing like this seems to have been at-
tempted. Indeed, the Indonesians apparently went out of their
way to rub the Australian negotiators' noses in the Indonesian
position and the Australians acquiesced. Note the title of the
Treaty: it refers to "An Area Between the Indonesian Province
of East Timor and Northern Australia." If Australia objects to
the mode of incorporation, why would it not insist all along on a
formula such as "the territory currently under the de facto con-
trol of Indonesia"81 or something of that ilk. I am certainly not
privy to any departmental material on the drafting history of
the Timor Gap Treaty, but it does seem to me that the Austra-
conceding de facto but not de jure control. Much modern state practice (but apparently
not Australia's) downplays the difficult distinction between de facto and de jure recogni-
tion, and indeed formal recognition in general. The distinction has always seemed to be
one of degree, with de jure coming after some significant passage of time indicating a
greater degree of permanency. De jure recognition, because of its name, inevitably car-
ries with it some connotation of prescriptive legitimacy. The absolutely weakest possible
interpretation of the non-recognition principle is that it forbids explicitly granting de
jure recognition. See Blix, supra note 78, at 664 (emphasis in original.): "It. is believed
that this formula [in the 1970 Declaration] may be interpreted to mean that no formal
admission may be made of the legality of a forcible acquisition as described." This
would permit some accommodation of the aggressor while still making the basic point
about illegitimacy. Obviously, I think the obligation goes beyond that. For an example of
Australia's (shifting) recognition policy, including its unique recognition and de-recogni-
tion of the Soviet Union's de jure sovereignty over the Baltic States, see Keith Suter,
Australia's New Policy on Recognizing Governments, 61 AusTL. Q. 59 (1989).
8' I have in mind the language of the Boundary Agreement between China and Pa-
kistan of 2 March 1963, which admits that India (and possibly the Kashmiris them-
selves) may have some claims to the area in question, by speaking of "the alignment of
the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is
under the actual control of Pakistan." Text in 2 I.L.M. 541 (1963). Six of the treaty
reads:
The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute
between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will re-open nego-
tiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China, on the boundary,
as described in Article Two of the present Agreement, of Kashmir, so as to sign a
Boundary Treaty to replace the present Agreement.
Provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provi-
sions of this Agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the
formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between Pakistan and the People's Republic
of China.
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lian negotiators fell over themselves to accommodate the Indo-
nesian position on incorporation right from the start. Even ac-
cepting their premise that some deal had to be cut, I am not
persuaded that it was lawful to cut one that gives away so much
on the recognition point.82
Moreover, when the Treaty shares out the proceeds of ex-
ploitation of the area, why did Australia not insist on putting
some of its share, along with Indonesia's, in a trust fund for the
people of East Timor? In a 1990 speech, Senator Evans com-
mented that the Australian recognition of the Indonesian incor-
poration means that "Australia has been able to work together
constructively and effectively with the Indonesian authorities in
improving the economic situation of the people of East Ti-
mor." 83 I believe that this is not a contention that the profits
from the exploitation of the area will benefit the people of Ti-
mor as a matter of treaty obligation, although there may be
some benefits derived in practice. It is true that the Treaty re-
fers to the desire of the Governments to "cooperate further for
the mutual benefit of their peoples in the development of the
resources of the area"8 4 and to taking "appropriate measures to
8' There is one other possible line of inquiry as to this aspect of the situation. The
Treaty is "provisional" in nature in the sense that it is an "interim" solution pending a
final agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf. It will last, however, for a
minimum of 40 years. See the first preambular paragraph and 33 of the Treaty. In an
article in Backgrounder Magazine, Vol. 1, No. 8 on 23 February 1990, entitled Australia
Rejects Portuguese Criticism of Timor Gap Treaty, the Australian Department of For-
eign Affairs and Trade emphasized this interim point. The Department commented:
The treaty itself contains provisions to the effect that it will not prejudice the
position of either Australia or Indonesia in respect of permanent delimitation of
the continental shelf in the Zone of Cooperation. Therefore Australia does not
concede that any sovereign rights over seabed resources that appertain to the land
mass of East Timor in fact extend into the Zone of Cooperation.
The assertion that the people of East Timor have permanent sovereign rights over
the seabed resources in the Zone of Cooperation is not accepted by Australia. Con-
sistent with this position is the fact that Australia had never conceded, prior to
1975, any Portuguese interest in the area of seabed forming part of the Zone of
Cooperation.
In short, the interim nature of the solution is not meant as a device to protect the rights
of the people of East Timor, if any. They are cut out of the deal. Again, it should have
been possible to draft language which expressly protected the position of an eventually
separate East Timor - even while disagreeing about what its legal rights might be. But
this was not done.
s' Statement to Timor Gap Forum, supra note 21.
Treaty, preambular para. 5.
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ensure that preference is given in employment in Area A to na-
tionals and permanent residents of Australia and the Republic
of Indonesia. 8 5  But here, "Indonesia" probably means
"Jakarta" - there is not a word in the Treaty about anything for
the people of Timor. Why should not one or both of the parties
to the Treaty be earmarking some of the proceeds for the people
of East Timor?
V. THE TREATY IS NULL AND VOID
I come then to the point that the Timor Gap Treaty should
be regarded as a nullity under international law. There is a fairly
fundamental assumption, but I think a plainly correct one, in
what follows: If Australia and Indonesia were to embark on a
judicial or arbitral delimitation8 6 of the relevant parts of the
continental shelf,87 a decision entitling Australia to the whole of
areas A, B and C is almost inconceivable. My guess is that they
would succeed in respect to Area B, and possibly some of Area
A, but probably none of Area C. If they were to win with respect
to all three areas, my argument about recognition, while it would
be relevant to the actual territory of East Timor, would be irrel-
evant with respect to territory that by virtue of the delimitation
would belong to Australia. Australia is presumably entitled to
give away some of its own resources to its good neighbor. My
contention of course is that, far from giving away its own re-
sources, it is engaged with an aggressor in sharing out someone
else's resources. The Timor Gap Treaty, in some significant part,
divides up resources obtained by aggression even if, in the ab-
sence of a final delimitation, one cannot be sure exactly which
part this is.
85 Treaty, operative para. 24.
" Delimitation is "[tihe act of fixing, marking off, or describing the limits or bound-
ary line of a territory, country, authority, right, statutory exception or the like." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 427 (6th ed. 1990). 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, on delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent
coasts, speaks of achieving "an equitable solution" on the basis of international law.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 83(1) at 29-30.
There is much learning and numerous instances determined by third-party dispute-set-
tlement and procedures, but the outcome in a particular case is not highly predictable.
Many of the authorities are mentioned in Cook, supra note 18.
" Supra, text accompanying note 15.
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There are at least two lines of argument why I believe this
effort to be null and void. I shall call them the "Nemo Dat" and
"Jus Cogens" arguments. They both lead inexorably to the same
conclusion.
(i) Nemo dat quod non habet
Ian Brownlie, in his leading text on public international law,
notes that the maxim Nemo dat quod non habet, the principle
that you cannot give a better title than you have, is a "familiar
feature of English commercial law, and the principle which the
maxim represents is undoubtedly a part of international law." 88
A domestic law analogy helps to grasp the point: I buy your car
from a thief. You find me in possession of it. You are entitled to
have your car back, and I must seek redress from the thief for
the purchase price of the car. This is true whether or not I know
of the circumstances of the thief's acquisition. The thief gets no
title, and I cannot get a good title through the thief. Notice that
in domestic law my legal problems get potentially worse, much
worse, if it can be shown that I knew of the thief's thievery.
Then I may be a receiver of stolen property or an accessory after
the fact. I would thus be liable to criminal sanctions, as well as
to suit in tort or delict. 9 Australia seems to be in this worse
88 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OP PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (4th ed. 1990).
Brownlie refers to the Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
The Arbitrator held that Spain could transfer no more territorial rights under the 1898
Treaty of Paris than she herself had. In particular Spain could not transfer Dutch terri-
tory forming part of the Netherlands Indies (now Indonesia).
88 1 have not explored this line of thought in depth in the international area, but it
leads quickly into two other bodies of material that at least characterize the Indonesian
effort: (1) The invasion was an international crime as understood in the General Assem-
bly's Reaffirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. RES. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Resolutions, at 188,
U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946) (crime by individual), in 19 of the International Law Com-
mission's draft on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/
31/10 (1976) (crime by state), and in 15 of the Draft Articles on the Draft Code of Of-
fenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentary thereto adopted by
the International Law Commission on first reading (unnumbered 1991 U.N. Doc. on file
with author) (individual criminal responsibility). Moreover, there was serious talk about
the criminal responsibility of a certain Iraqi leader whose actions sound rather like some
of those in East Timor. See, e.g., "International Law Mavens Picture New Order," NAT.
L.J., Feb. 11, 1991, at 5. (2) The invasion was a breach of an obligation erga omnes, as
that concept was floated by the dicta of the I.C.J. in the Case Concerning The Barcelona
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position since it has known the circumstances all along. But it
does not seem necessary to pursue the argument that far. On
any theory, Australia cannot get a good title through the bad
Indonesian one.
(ii) Jus cogens
Alternatively, the Treaty is null and void based on the prin-
ciple of jus cogens90 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (a treaty to which Australia acceded without
reservation in 1974) provides for what it calls Treaties Conflict-
ing with a Peremptory Norm of General international Law (Jus
Cogens):
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes
of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.91
The exact scope of Article 53 is disputed, notably the categories
of breaches of international law to which it applies. One thing,
though, is stunning: the basic Charter/Friendly Relations Decla-
ration rule proscribing the use of force is on every significant
commentator's list of jus cogens norms, starting with the Com-
mentary by the International Law Commission which drafted
the Convention.2 If Australia were to enter into an arrangement
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Judgment), 1970 I.C.J. 4, at 32, which
lists "acts of aggression" as one of the breached rights which, in view of their impor-
tance, all states can be said to have a legal interest in their protection. Does this mean
that someone other than Portugal or the Timorese can enforce against Indonesia the
right of East Timor not to be forcibly taken off the map? Where does this lead on a
complicity argument with Australia?
1* I do not wish to overstate the distinctiveness of the two arguments - they may
well be essentially alternative modes of expressing the same point.
' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
92 [19661 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. See
also the most comprehensive discussion of the topic to date LAuRi HANNIKAINEN, PE-
REMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 163-64, 323-56 (1988); And see
Crawford, supra note 69, at 81. The right to self-determination is listed by many scholars
as a norm of jus cogens. See Hannikainen at 357-424. But see Crawford, id. See G.A.
RES. 35/118, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/37/48 (1980), the
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with Indonesia to jointly invade and take over the territory of
East Timor, that agreement would clearly be void under the pe-
remptory norm doctrine. Logically, the same result follows if the
territory is shared out after the invasion, even if Australia had
completely clean hands at the point of conquest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The way in which Australia has attempted to avoid the ap-
plication of one or other of these arguments is by suggesting that
its recognition of Indonesian title gets it off the hook. In my
humble submission this simply will not fly, for the reasons I sug-
gested earlier in the paper. The sleight of hand in trying to
avoid the problem by "recognizing" Indonesia's title will not
work under the modern international law which Australia itself
helped to create. This law provides for the non-recognition of
territories acquired by the use of force. Thus, the recognition
itself is void!
Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in para. 5 of which the General Assembly:
Categorically rejects any agreement, arrangement or unilateral action by colonial
and racist Powers which ignores, violates, denies or conflicts with the inalienable
rights of peoples under colonial domination to self-determination and
independence.
Thus, the right to self-determination of the Timorese supports a separate argument for
the treaty being void. Note, however, that while Portugal's case in the International
Court, supra note 19, stresses the self-determination aspects of the situation, it does not
need to go so far as to argue the invalidity of the Timor Gap Treaty.
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